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Carlo Michelstaedter:
The Tragedy
of Thought

Daniela Bini

The silence that surrounded the death of Carlo Michelstaedter
in 1910 can be explained in the light of the Italian cultural climate
of the time, which was dominated by Benedetto Croce. In Croce's
philosophical system, based on the strict separation between the
human faculties, there was no space for a personality like
Michelstaedter' s whose aim was the abolition of this very separation. He was, in fact, a philosopher, a painter and a poet, constantly changing his mode of expression in an ever frustrating
attempt to grasp the essence of life and to find the perfect expressive form. 1
Born in Gorizia in 1887 into a Jewish family of high cultural
tradition, Carlo Michelstaedter was a spokesman of that complex
Middle-European culture. Although he spent his most productive
years in Florence where he attended the university, and although
he considered himself Italian, he did not take part in the
philosophical movement of the time-his scorn for Croce was
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open. 2 Besides the Greek philosophers whom he studied at the
university, he was strongly influenced by northern thinkers:
Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Tolstoy, Dostojevski, Ibsen, and by
Beethoven's music.
Michelstaedter killed himself in 1910, at 23. The reason for
his action, as is often the case with suicides, remains purely
speculative. Yet he left enough material to give some support to
conjectures on the existential crisis that brought him to his precocious end. 3
In a letter to his sister Paula, who, like the Paolina of Leopardi,
was also his confidant, Carlo made a lucid diagnosis of his illness:
It is in part an individual condition, in part the illness of the age
[la malattiadell'epoca]insofar as moral balance is concerned, because
we are presently living in an age in which changes in society seem
to go hand-in-hand with a dissolution of all bonds . . . and the
pathways of existence are no longer sharply drawn . . . and it
depends upon personal initiative to create the luminous path
through universal chaos. 4

He was only 19 then, but had already clearly analyzed a disease
which was historical and for which there was no cure. He was
totally aware of living in the era of God's death, as Nietzsche had
stated, and with the death of God, of the end of all absolutes and
eternal truths; the end, that is, of all the myths created by man .
Schopenhauer had opened to him the path in this direction and
Nietzsche must have accompanied him through it. Carlo, however, is also able to perform self-analysis, to look into himself and
to discover his own weaknesses, or dark side. In the same letter,
in fact, he writes:
I suffer because I feel cowardly, weak, because I see myself as
incapable of controlling things and people as I am incapable of
controlling the ideas that race through my head . . . the way I have
no control over my passions; because I have no moral balance ...
because I have no intellectual equilibrium, so that thought goes
straight to its goal ... because ... everything is slipping through
my hands . .. and more and more I'm convinced that I am but a
degenerate . (Epistolario157)

Carlo's tragedy was that he could not accept his weakness, neither
could he accept the small lot that destiny had assigned him and
all other human beings. He strove to imitate the great persuasi of
history: Socrates and Christ, who freed themselves from con-
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tingency and in whom the coincidence of thought and action,
theory and practice was realized.
Carlo writes a whole thesis to try to understand and explain
his idea of Persuasioneand its opposite, Rettorica. The thesis had
begun as an examination of these two concepts in Plato and Aristotle, but it soon left the two Greek philosophers behind. Carlo's
frustration is apparent from the start. Persuasione,his goal, his life
model, not only cannot be achieved, but cannot even be defined,
except negatively and through metaphors. Although it is man's
main goal, he can achieve it only through death. Its essence, in
fact, is contradictory to that of physical life.
His metaphor of the weight well exemplifies it. The essence
of the weight is to fall; this is its will, destined to be frustrated.
Were the weight, in fact, to reach its goal, to fulfill its need, that
is, falling, it would be falling· to its end, stasis, in other words the
opposite of its essence.
So it is with man's essence: "I know I want," writes
Michelstaedter, "and I do not have what I want". 5 Man's essence,
thus, as Leopardi had already said, consists in his will, in his
desire; it consists in a lack, in a nonbeing, in an infinite and
never-ending tension. Man desires the absolute, which does not
exist, or it exists only as a tension because, like for the weight, if
it existed it would cease to be an absolute. Its essence, therefore,
is negative and Michelstaedter states it clearly when he explains:
I have never known what the absolute is, yet I know it the way
the insomniac knows sleep, the way the beholder of darkness
knows light. This I know, that my conscience ... is made up of
lack [e fatta di deficienza]. (Persuasione96)

Yet, continues Carlo, the real "persuaso" is he who needs nothing
from outside for he has all in himself (44).
This extreme position is doomed to be frustrated, and Carlo
knows it well. Man needs others and the world outside; his being
is determined by that of others. He is so certain of the impossibility
of achieving Persuasionethat he calls the second chapter of his
work "L'illusione della persuasione." This "illusion" is born when
man transforms that which exists only for himself, that which is
good only for himself into objective entities, into the absolute
good. In Chapter 3, where he tries to show the "route to Persuasion," his fatal destiny becomes evident.
Twenty pages extremely rich in images, metaphors, parables.
The use of the Gospels, as well as of the Greek texts, is constant.
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Statements are presented, with the authority of axioms, as absolute truths, unshakable and indubitable. Yet they are totally
abstract and detached from reality. They culminate in the maxim
"to give is to do the impossible; to give is to receive" (82). Man
must affirm himself not in order to continue to exist, "he must
love the world not because it is necessary to his own needs, but
for what it is, in itself" (82). In short he must live without relation
with the other, without "weight," having escaped the law of gravity, that is, having overcome that law which bodies obeyed and
in which their nature or essence consists. This he must do, not
as Plato did, trying to reach the absolute by clinging to his body,
but as Socrates and Christ, renouncing their bodies, in the recognition that man must deny his physical being in order to obtain
his absolute one.
Michelstaedter seems to hope for a return to Parmenides, 6 a
position which, as Campailla intelligently points out, finds today
a fertile ground in the philosophy of Emanuele Severino, but
which, nevertheless, has strong opponents in the philosophers
of "II Pensiero Debole" whose leading exponent is Gianni Vattimo.7 Vattimo, faithful follower of Heidegger, states, in line with
hermeneutics: "Non si da' essere se non come evento, come accadere di orizzonti linguistici, entro cui gli enti ci divengono accessibili; I' essere e solo questo accadere e il suo tramandarsi. " 8 Against
Parmenides: "being is not ... rather, it 'happens'," that is "becomes." Being, therefore, exists insofar as it becomes; it exists as
"becoming. " 9
Michelstaedter's wish, however, is the desperate illusion of
one aware of the impossibility of its ever becoming true. He too
believed that one can know "being" only through "becoming,"
as he was aware of the impossibility of achieving Persuasione,or
consistency with the Parmenidean on for it would exclude "becoming," and therefore the life of nature. Yet he could not abandon
the belief in an absolute being, never changing, self-contained,
self-sufficient, and, what was more, he could not renounce the
desire of making his own self into it. It was this dichotomy that
tore him in two. He lived it more intensely than other thinkers
since he himself had such a physical, sensual nature.
The Epistolariois the best source for this important aspect of
Michelstaedter' s personality. The hundreds of letters written at
home and to his intimate friends clearly show the intensity of his
sensuality and physical being, which he let come out with little
restraint. It immediately appears evident how much Carlo treasures and cultivates this side of himself: his exhausting mountain
climbing, his passion for dancing ("a physical pleasure, an un-
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matched voluptuousness" he calls it [Epistolario98]), his long
swims in the rough waters of the Isonzo which made him famous
and proud, and his frustrations when an injury to his leg blocked
him at home for some time. He was constantly pushing himself
to the limits of his capabilities, and nature was his beloved playground. There he had the illusion of reaching that absolute that
as a social being he never could even approach.
The letter written at home describing the funeral of Carducci
succeeds perhaps better than others in pointing out this aspect
of Carlo's nature. It does it with the force created by a contrast.
The main subject, in fact, is death, yet its end is a hymn to sensual
life. Carlo loves Bologna for its richness, abundance, fullness of
life. The qualifiers he chooses to describe it are self-explanatory:
I think of Bologna again, of the past three days; they appear to be
an oasis of a superior sun and life, so intense, that I'll be scarred by
it for the rest of my life. But then, I love Bologna, with its porticos,
its beautiful dark-redplazzos, its beautiful vast piazzas, its imposing
San Petronio church, its lively movement . . . of happy people
everywhere in throngs to see and to be seen enjoying life. I love
the generousand sincere cordiality of the people, I like the teeming
public placs, full of life and warmth, and ... more than anything
else, I love its women, opulent, radiant with life, who smile when
smiled at, and who seem to give themselves entirely through the
glance {sguardo].(186) [My Emphasis]

We seem almost to be listening to the voice of Zeno Cosini, another
lover of intense living, women and action, and likewise a victim
of thought and reflection.
Carlo too is fully aware of this dichotomy of action and
thought. He shows it when he writes to Paula: "Above all, I think
of my body, it is important to me," and a few paragraphs later:
"I must stop talking about myself, because I must stop looking
into myself-it can be intellectually useful, but it's not healthy"
(305, 306). Again it is Zeno who comes to mind with his theory
that thought and self-analysis paralyze action and make it impossible.10 The "intellectually useful" thus coincides with the physically damaging. Zeno, however, makes his choice and accepts its
consequences: he will be a paralytic thinker, and when he will
decide to follow his impulse and pursue a woman, he will just
do it without trying to rationalize it. And he even laughs at himself.
Carlo cannot choose, neither can he laugh nor accept the necessity
of compromise. In his Nietzschean dream of asserting himself as
the iiber-Mensch, he prefers death to compromise.
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To his great friend Gaetano Chiavacci, Carlo writes a beautiful
letter where he explains his torment. It's a letter written from
Gorizia describing the days spent vacationing at Pirano with Paula
and the Cassini sisters. Days of physical activities: walking, climbing, swimming, sailing, dancing; where even talking is purposely
reduced to a minimum in order to live more intensely the life of
nature (Epistolario331). Carlo's enjoyment and fulfillment are evident. The descriptions are detailed together with those of the
nature which was the perfect background of the activities and
with which Carlo seems to reach a perfect union.
The appealing offer made to him by some fishermen to remain
with them and live on the sea, though not taken seriously, makes
Carlo feel that he is part of that nature. But Carlo is also a creature
of thought. The beautiful comparison of his brain to the sea conveys all the power and intensity of Carlo's chaotic needs and
feelings:
My mind is like an undulating sea that reflects all lights, that mirrors
... all the skies ... but that shatters them all at the focal point-but
the bottom remains murky and dark ... certainly I have what the
sea has not: I have the uninterrupted torment of bygone intentions
and of future commitments, of the different and unfulfilled yearnings: the consciousness of my meaninglessness [nullita] in this
world regulated by actions as well as by thought and art; of life
dissolving awaiting what? In the illusion of a progresive shaping
[formarsi]that does not exist. (330)

The image could not have been more effective. The sea, symbol
of the force, vitality, infinity and freedom of nature, is here made
to coincide (or at least Carlo is trying to make it do so) with the
intellectual, spiritual absolute. But this attempt is bound to fail;
the two can never coincide.
Carlo's brain is like the sea with its strength, force, freedom,
but also with its dark, irrational, turbid side. The brain-sea image
proves his nonacceptance to be only like the sea or the fisherman,
and his need and continuous attempt to be everything: nature
and spirit, action and ideal to a degree of perfection. And frustration follows frustration. "I realize with growing terror that I am
condemned to staying outside of the intensity, passion, greatness
of life, and that I will never have a way of living it within me"
(331). And in his depression he admits: "There would be nothing
left for me to do than a physical violent life, go wandering on
horseback through the plains and rest at night in a tent counting
the stars." Leopardi's presence is powerful, as is this ultimate
negative response to this rhetorical proposition. As for the Leopar-
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dian shepherd, the life of nature is not enough for Carlo, yet
intellectual fulfillment escapes him:
There is no possibility for me to embrace a larger whole .... So I
am unable to think or write or paint; I loathe myself ... I am so
unhappy-and
I see no chance of anything changing except to get
worse. (336-37)

Carlo's complete awareness of this tension within himself is
even more evident when his good friend Rico leaves on a ship
for the American adventure. He feels admiration and envy. So
well can he analyze his contradictory feelings that, writing to Nino
about their common friend, he comments: "la lettera di Rico ...
mi mise il fuoco addosso per quanto penso a noi, che, invidiandolo, siamo impediti nel volerlo raggiungere dalle stesse cose che
c'impedirono di partir con lui" (436). But Carlo belongs only in
part to "the race of those who remain on earth." 11 And this was
to be his tragedy.
The one hundred polemical pages Carlo devotes to "la Rettorica" are dictated by his strong need for authenticity and his
hatred of hypocrisy and empty words. He can finally be effective,
as he could never be in talking about "Persuasione," for he has
a solid ground on which to move and real foes to attack. His tone
is highly sarcastic, even vitriolic. Here he pours out his own fustrations as a man. "Persuasione" cannot be achieved and it is
useless even to speak about it, since, as he teaches, "Persuasione"
cannot be put into words-it will necessarily transform itself into
"Rettorica" -but it must be lived. Now he can finally say with
plenty of examples what "Rettorica" is. He appears as a great
rhetorician-hence
his poison and fury. In his very fight against
"Rettorica," he is caught in it.
The life of "Persuasione" is thus unattainable; man becomes
lost in his search for it. He needs help and clings to something
or someone; he asks to be for someone. "Owing to his illusion,
he calls what 'is' what 'is for him'; he calls it good or bad according
to whether he Iikes it or dislikes it" (Persuasione97). He creates
"Rettorica" malgrelui. It seems hard to believe how Michelstaedter,
caught in this impasse, refused to overcome it by accepting it, as
the only possible way for man to be. Although he affirmed that
"l'uomo deve accontentarsi del segno convenzionale che nasconde
l'oscurita" (101), he himself could never accept darkness, and
continued to fight for the inexistent light. He knew, however,
that the only light obtainable in this world is the one of he who
"turns himself into flame." 12
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The step Carlo could not or did not want to take was instead
taken by Heidegger as he asserted the linguistic essence of being,
and his followers are today continuing in this line . Truth "has no
metaphysical or logical nature, only a rhetorical one," says G.
Vattimo. "Truth is the result of interpretation ... because it is
only in the interpretative process that truth constitutes itself. " 13
This is hermeneutics, today's philosophy, which "in inheriting
and bringing to its ultimate consequences a diffuse tendency in
twentieth-century thought, it concentrates on the relationship between language and being, and on the interpretive characteristic
of all of existence ." 14 Vattimo calls his new philosophy "the weak
ontology" or the "pluralistic ontology" in which plurality is not a
moment to be rescued and overcome in a higher synthesis, in a
final unity, but it is a permanent condition. 15 He well sees the
relation of such a position with the rediscovery of the tragic element of the human condition, characteristic of some neoexistentialist modern philosophy like that of Pareyson and Cacciari. But
after all, as D. Antiseri says, this "weak thought" has its strength,
which lies in "its capability of understanding its limit. " 16
The discourse developed by Heidegger and his followers is
a theoretical discourse. Being exists only in its becoming and its
relation to us interpreters . The Parmenidean on does not exist, or
to be more precise, it does not concern us because even if it existed
we could not know it. This discovery guides men in their theoretical as well as practical life: a life which must be accepted with its
limits and lived within them .
Michelstaedter, who followed this theoretical discourse up to
the end, could not renounce the Parmenidean on, well aware that,
having followed his reasoning coherently, the possession of the
absolute on would be impossible-a contradiction in terms. He
well knew that Persuasioneis an aporia. His attempt, therefore,
was to move it from the dangerous grounds of theoretics to those
of practice . 17 Persuasionecannot be known and expressed through
concepts-it would transform itself into Rettorica; it must be lived.
It is not the knowledgeof the absolute that must be sought, but
the life of the absolute.
He therefore continues his search. Socrates and Christ had
taught man to renounce the finite, material side of his nature, to
affirm himself as a self-contained and self-sufficient being, with
no needs for and dependence on the external world. Since life is
needs, the negation of all needs is death . The finite individual
who wants himself infinite knows that he can only be it through
the destruction of his finite, empirical being.
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Although nobody can ascertain the reasons behind
Michelstaedter's suicide, it must be said, to pay justice to a victim
of honest thought, that his rigorous logic had brought him to the
conclusion that
Only when you do not want will you have what you want, because
what you want is absolute being, and your will is all but contingency: it is not in itself ... as long as it will be, your body will
cast a shadow so that you cannot see; when you will no longer be,
you will have the possibility of seeing. (Opere 781)18

So he chose to be no more.

1. Studies on Michelstaedter concentrate mainly on his philosophy. Sergio
Campailla is the only scholar who has tried to examine extensively the rest of
his production. See his Pensieroe poesiadi CarloMichelstaedter(Bologna: Patron,
1973) and excellent edition of Michelstaedter's collected poems: Poesie(Bologna:
Patron, 1974). He also gathered his drawings and paintings in a handsome book
and wrote an enlightening introduction, CarloMichelstaedter,Operagraficae pittorica (Gorizia: Istituto per gli Incontri Culturali Mitteleuropei, Arti Grafiche
Campestrini, 1975). For a comparative analysis of Michelstaedter's philosophy,
poetry and painting, see my article "Michelstaedter tra 'Persuasione' e 'Rettorica,"' ltalica 4 (1986) 346-60.
2. His caustic remarks against Croce are in "Scritti Vari," Carlo Michelstaedter, Opere (Florence: Sansoni, 1958) 245, 226-62, 837.
3. As Brianese clearly summarizes in his book on Michelstaedter, critics
have since 1910 been divided on the issue of his suicide. Those who have called
it "philosophical" or "metaphysical" see it as the final act, in line with his
theoretical beliefs. Those instead who have read Michelstaedter as praising life
and action against theory and reflection, see it as his moment of weakness.
Giorgio Brianese, L'arcoe ii destino. Interpretazionedi Michelstaedter(Abano Terme:
Francisci, 1985) 83.
4. Carlo Michelstaedter, Epistolario(Milan: Adelphi, 1983) 158.
5. Carlo Michelstaedter, La Persuasionee la Rettorica(Milan: Adelphi, 1982)
39. In the text it will be abbreviated as Persuasione.
6. Recently there has been a polemic between scholars about Michelstaedter' s return to Parmenides. E. Severino and his disciple G. Brianese consider
Michelstaedter's Eleatism as a misunderstanding of Parmenides since the Parmenidean on is a metaphysical entity which can only be known. F. Fratta, on
the other hand, tries to interpret Michelstaedter's search for the on in an antimetaphysical direction, where the aim is practical and not theoretical. Fratta's
interpretation will be examined later. Francesco Fratta, II doveredell'essere.Critica
dellametafisicae stanzaeticain CarloMichelstaedter(Milan: Unicopli, 1986) 158-59.
7. Sergio Campailla points it out in his Introduction to La Persuasione19.
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8. Gianni Vattimo, in Dove va la filosofia italiana?(Bari: Laterza, 1986) 190.
9. Gianni Vattimo, II pensierodebole(Milan: Feltrinelli, 1985) 19. An English
translation by Peter Carravetta is forthcoming from Johns Hopkins University
Press.
10. The humorous scene of the "fifty-four muscles set in motion in just half
a second" in a single step well exemplifies it. It shows as well, however, the
distance between the two writers. Svevo's detachment from his own actions
gives him the ability of analyzing and of laughing at them. It is this very capability
to laugh that helps him to overcome the crisis brought about by the discovery
of life's senselessness. Italo Svevo, Confessionsof Zeno, trans. by Beryl De Zoete
(New York: Vintage Books, 1958) 94.
11. Eugenio Montale, Tutte le poesie(Milan: Mondadori, 1977) 23.
12. "Dialogo delle salute," Opere781. The same words appear at the closing
of "Della Persuasione" (Persuasione88).
13. II pensierodebole26 (translation mine)
14. Dove va la filosofiaitaliana?188. In his recent volume Ascoltareil silenzio,
Paolo Valesio, continuing on the same line, points out the necessity to rid rettorica
of its pejorative connotations and, instead, to see it as the real philosophical
activity, since it "riflette e celebra la creativita umana dentro la lingua-le possibilita, apparentemente sconfinate, di esprimersi nel mondo." It is this rettorica,
he continues later, "che succede alla filosofia, la retorica ... che sottentra alla
filosofia esaurita" (Bologna: il Mulino, 1986) 295, 349.
15. Ibid. 192. The translation is mine.
16. Ibid. 171.
17. Campailla had already pointed out the importance of ethics in
Michelstaedter and this theme was developed in my essay (see note 1) where
the relationship between Leopardi and Michelstaedter together with his great
admiration for Socrates and Christ were analyzed. The importance of ethics is
also the core of Francesco Fratta's recent book. In it he calls the route to Persuasione "the categorical imperative" which must direct the life of the "persuaso."
"La persuasione," he writes, "e una dimensione altra, che nessun linguaggio
umano potra mai giungere ad esprimere. Da un punto di vista teoretico e un
concetto irrimediabilmente aporetico. Essa e conosciuta soltanto ... da coloro
che sanno che nulla, in cio che esiste, e veramente reale e che il valore della vita
e tutto nella liberazione dall'illusione del se" (op. cit. 156, 169). It is hard to
explain, however, why Fratta refused to connect this conclusion with
Michelstaedter' s suicide.
18. Brianese's conclusion seems more coherent with the development of
Michelstaedter's thought than Fratta's. Commenting on his awareness of the
impossibility to live the life of Persuasione ("l'impossibile superamento della
finitezza da parte del finito"), he sees Persuasioneas "l'ideale-limite cui l'uomo
non potra mai giungere, ma al quale non per questo deve cessare di tendere."
The real "persuaso," he continues, "non-e-piu. La vita, dunque, e inevitabilmente
retorica .... La persuasione, in quanto tenta di negare la volonta di continuare
(nella quale la vita consiste) e l'atto in cui la vita stessa e estinta" (op. cit. 71,
72, 80). In his interesting essay La differenzaebraica.Ebraismoe Grecitain Michelstaedter (Bologna: Cappelli, 1984) Piero Pieri reaches the same conclusion.

